Air Cargo Screening and Security: A Collaborative Solution for Compliance

Air Cargo Screening and Security: A Collaborative Solution for Compliance

Erik Hoffer, President, CGM Security Solutions, Inc.

Walt Beadling, Managing Partner, Cayuga Partners LLC

Introduction

On August 3, 2007, President Bush signed the 9/11 Act (1) into law with the objective of protecting the United States from terrorist attacks.  The legislation, nearly 6 years in the making and 286 pages in length, is well-intentioned, complex and sweeping in scope, yet often lacking in detail.

In particular, those sections related to improving air cargo security are long on what and when, but woefully short on how.  Given the ambiguity of the legislation, enormity of the task and the cost and number of players involved, it is not surprising that little substantive progress toward compliance has been made to date.  

The objective of this document is, therefore, three-fold:

1.  To help both industry and the airlines to better understand the 9/11 Act as it relates to air cargo security, and how they can work within its provisions to help secure our borders and citizens from terrorist attacks using air cargo as a delivery method.

2.  To propose a proven, cost-effective solution that can preempt, and prevent, terrorist attacks using air cargo, thereby protecting passenger aircraft carrying cargo, and meeting the objectives of the 9/11 Act within the stated time frames.

3.  To establish a consortium of concerned parties – shippers, carriers, industry groups and technology providers – to endorse, and rapidly deploy, this solution as a de facto industry standard.     

Overview of the 9/11 Act Legislation and Cargo Screening Program

Regarding improving air cargo on passenger jets and freighters, the law states that 50% of all cargo must be screened to provide a level of security “commensurate with that of passenger checked baggage” within 18 months of enactment (by February, 2009) and 100% within 3 years (by August, 2010).  The 100% screening requirement has already taken effect for parcels on narrow body passenger aircraft.

The law places the onus of inspection on the shipper first, the carrier second and lastly those who would assist, for a fee, the other two in screening and subsequently securing cargo to be delivered to a commercial passenger liner for transport.  The law does not deal directly with freighter aircraft or the goods that are shipped on freighters, nor does it address couriers, 3PL’s, forwarders and other consolidation facilities that ship air cargo throughout the United States.  Further, the law applies only to domestic cargo; obviously we cannot impose, or enforce, U.S. supply chain security standards outside our borders.  We must therefore rely on other countries, delivering cargo by air to our shores, to do it in a like manner

In an effort to increase screening capacity, relieve the burden on air carriers and expedite the “flow of commerce”, in early 2008 the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), a voluntary program designed to enable vetted, validated, and certified supply chain facilities to screen cargo and thereby increase screening capacity and expedite flow of commerce(2).  The CCSP is a facility based program for supply chain entities located domestically, within the borders of the United States.  Any facility that tenders cargo directly to an air carrier or indirect air carrier (IAC) may apply to become a CCSF, including manufacturers, warehouses, distribution centers, third party logistics providers (3PL’s), indirect air carriers, airport cargo handlers and independent cargo screening facilities.

The Problem

At this writing it appears highly unlikely that the program objectives will be met within the prescribed timeframes, despite the TSA’s efforts to develop, and pilot, viable screening solutions.

In 2008, an estimated 45 billion Revenue Ton Miles (RTMs) of cargo will be shipped by air within, to, and from the U.S.  Given the sheer volume of cargo to be processed and loaded onto aircraft, full electronic screening, as required for passenger baggage, presents significant logistical and operational challenges - and the size and complexity of the air cargo system continues to grow (3).

The operational detail of the 9/11 Act regarding air cargo security, specifically how to inspect cargo and under what conditions, and then how to secure, seal and ensure the chain of custody for inspected cargo, is grey and undefined.  At a U.S. Security Conference hosted by Lufthansa Cargo on September 30, 2008, Ed Kelly, the Transportation Security Administration's General Manager, declared that the specific inspection machinery to be used, and how to employ it, is still being determined (4).  Adding to the confusion are different requirements and standards for screening shipments on passenger aircraft and cargo carriers.

Despite a lack of specifics regarding the process and an obvious need for clarification, elements of the law have not yet been challenged by shippers or carriers.

Vague, poorly defined processes and procedures

The problem begins with the vague definition of terms in the inspection process itself, e.g., what, exactly, is a “piece of cargo”?  Is it an entire air pallet, or a single box?  What happens when cargo is interlined, and the air pallet has to be broken?  Does this mean that all of the cargo has to be re-screened as single parcels?  If so, the argument can be made that all cargo in single units, or in bulk, be screened simultaneously as a unit of measure if destined for the same consignee.  In any case, it is known that there are very few ways to securely seal a corrugated box that are compliant with this law.

The inspection process is further compromised by a lack in standardization and consistency of use among the various types of machines installed at different airports.  The variability of an inspection process that uses different machines, inspecting different packages for different variables in different ways, calls into question the feasibility of the assumed process and controls mandated by law vs. the ability of personnel and availability of facilities and equipment to accomplish the task.  Peter Harris, VP of Strategy and Development at Analogic Corporation, one of the manufacturers involved in screening equipment pilots, affirms that a “concept of operations” - how to do actually do this in and around an airport - has yet to be defined by the TSA(5).

Expensive, complex, unproven technology

The machinery required for inspecting a full air pallet or LD3, though similar to that used for passenger screening, is more massive, complicated, expensive and slow; the availability of space and facilities, throughput rates, cost of inspection and the ability to secure closures are l problematic.

If and when a particular type of equipment is specified, deployed and used by everyone equally, what will happen as technology advances, or the threat becomes more sophisticated, rendering the chosen technology obsolete?  Who will fund the necessary modifications, upgrades or replacements, and moreover, who will fund the initial purchases and implementation, given the current state of the art and cost?  Brandon Fried, Executive Director of Airforwarders Association (AfA), it may cost up to $200,000 per location to comply with CCSP, a heavy burden for small to medium-sized forwarders to assume without financial assistance, which can only come from our financially-challenged federal government.

Further, because the technologies currently in use have been designed to screen passenger baggage, it is not certain how effective they will be in air cargo applications.  According to Fried, none of the technologies tested so far has proven suitable for screening the dense loads typical of industrial shipping, from stacked machine parts to boxes piled on pallets or tightly packed in metal containers(5).

Coordinating a multitude of new supply chain players

There are three supply chain communities that must adhere to the TSA’s CCSF mandate: the shipper, who will soon become known as a Certified Shipper (effectively eliminating the current “Known Shipper” Program); the Certified Screening Facility and the Certified Air Carrier.

The first line of defense is the Certified Shipper; to comply with the law he must:

1.  In most cases, completely reengineer his infrastructure and facilities to create a secure environment with vetted personnel, fences, gates, locks, guards and cameras.

2.  Ensure that no one is allowed into his facilities without authorization, and that no one except trusted employees inspect, pack and seal his cargo.

If this is done to according to TSA standards, his goods can pass “GO” and then be moved, by a secure, vetted and certified carrier, directly to the airlines for shipment.  The Certified Shipper must also strictly adhere to the recommended best practices for secure sealing.  The TSA has yet to produce a document that specifies exactly what these best practices are, however.

This next step in the process will come under purview of dedicated service providers soon to be known as Certified Inspection Facilities.  These controlled access areas will be popping up throughout the USA, first at the major gateway airports - SFO, LAX, ATL, JFK, MIA - and later others, as they become necessary.  Certified Inspection Facilities will be managed by independent companies that currently have locations at these airports, secure facilities or ones that will soon become secure, and also those eager to provide this service at a fee to any shipper or carrier in need of it .

This new process will totally disrupt commerce by air as we know it, because many items are shipped through non-gateway airports and by unwilling carriers and uncertified shippers, which will cause a great deal of cargo to be re-routed by unsecured surface transportation to its destination, or shipped as commercial freight, all at a higher cost and at a slower speed.

By necessity, Certified Air Carriers (to be) have been assuming the burden of compliance to this point, but this initiative will be short lived. The cost of such operations in manpower, infrastructure, machinery and facility space makes the prospect daunting for most carriers, and the costs for commercial shippers will be far higher than current levels; the current economic downturn further exacerbates this problem.  Such cost increases will put many small shippers at a competitive disadvantage, and will move some portion of the supply chain flow to trucks and other modes of transportation. The next major shakeup in air cargo will come when air carriers are forced to reject tendered cargo because of they are unable to screen it in the volumes delivered thereby causing irreparable harm to shippers and lost revenues to carriers, all in the name of security.

Conflicting approaches and programs

Forcing compliance of foreign nations and carriers poses another difficult dilemma, and exposes further shortcomings in the legislation.  Will U.S. carriers who interline be required to do the inspection job of their foreign counterparts when these good arrive and are trans-shipped domestically?

Concurrently, we are trying to protect our borders through the voluntary Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)(6), first announced in November, 2001, that provides incentives for shippers to participate by expediting the passage of their cargo through customs and speeding supply chain flow.  This “carrot” approach contrasts with the “stick” of 9/11 Act cargo screening provisions that allows no threshold for compliance; they are mandatory and absolute, failure to adhere will result in costly fines to those who ignore the law.  Will these programs come into conflict, and if so, which will prevail?  Whether we can harmonize the security countermeasures of our foreign partners into an effective, compliant system remains to be seen.

Poorly defined processes and procedures; complex, expensive, unproven technology; a multitude of players; conflicting approaches and programs; yet perhaps the greatest flaw in the legislation is its reliance on a single approach to air cargo security: screening, which may be suitable for human traffic, but, largely due to chain of custody issues, is problematic for air cargo.

A Proposed Solution

Speaking at the recent Lufthansa-sponsored security conference, R. John Hansman, Professor of Aeronautics, Astronautics and Engineering Systems at MIT, referenced Reason’s "Swiss cheese" model(7) to promote a more comprehensive approach to cargo security.  It's a layered approach using multiple techniques; whereas one screening method might be 80% effective, it can be 99%+ effective when combined with other solutions that have different vulnerabilities.  In other words, by adding layers – or “slices” - to the air cargo security system, it will be almost impossible for evil-doers to find any holes in it.    

Also speaking at the conference, Dwayne Baird, TSA spokesperson and public affairs manager, noted that speeding up supply chain flow through commercial and cargo airlines while maintaining security is a recognized concern and key objective of the program.  "We want [shippers] to have equipment that can screen large volumes of goods offsite and certify the cargo as secure. As long as they maintain the chain of custody from their facility to our airport, we can consider that shipment as screened and secure."(8)  The critical, yet unanswered question is, how can the objective of establishing, and ensuring, the chain of custody be achieved?

CGM Security Solutions Inc.(9) and its partners propose establishment of a consortium to develop and rapidly deploy a layered solution, that will, together with the mandated screening, meet – and exceed - the objectives of the 9/11 Act regarding air cargo security: the “Cargo Brick”.  In addition to enhancing the effectiveness of the screening-only solution by ensuring the chain of custody, the Cargo Brick will reduce costs of compliance to shippers, and speed the flow of cargo through the supply chain.  This solution currently exists, is proven, uses recommended techniques and materials, complies with the law, and is affordable and immediately available for use to anyone, in a wide variety of formats and configurations.

The CGM Cargo Brick Concept employs:

• A pallet bag kit
• A Topp Clip
• Secure TRAC tape
• Standard ½ “ banding and crimping tool
• A process for inspecting, securing cargo and ensuring the chain of custody

Pallet Bag

Pallet Bag sealed with Topp Clipp®

The pallet bag is a strong, clear poly bag made to accept a specific size of cargo units bundled into a consistent size bag and sealed for security as one unit.  The ability of the bag to show tampering is excellent because it is clear, allowing for easy visual inspection of contents, and impenetrable without leaving an obvious mark.  This also makes it compliant with the tamper evident mandate of the law, as described below.

The ‘Brick’ concept also is a tremendous asset to air carriers in bulking out freight in a consistent form, making cubing out an aircraft, or an air pallet, becomes easier and far more efficient.  It facilitates the carrier’s ability to visually inspect the freight throughout the logistical cycle in accordance with the mandates of the screening law.  The Cargo Brick also reduces the time that carriers have to spend with the cargo, since it can be directly loaded without need of further scrutiny.  The Cargo Brick can be made to comply with the size and weight parameters of the electronic inspection devices used by the air carriers or inspection facilities.  This speeds up inspection flow as well as the loading and stripping out aircraft.

Indirect Air Carriers such as DHL, FedEx and UPS are perfect candidates for this type of packaging since many of their parcels are of a consistent size and shape and can be packed with this method seamlessly, with the equipment currently in place at their facilities.  The USPS would also greatly benefit from this process as their mail sleeves are of a consistent size, weight and shape.  These couriers can also create new services and profit centers by providing cargo inspection processes for their clients with a relatively small incremental investment.

Tamper evidency

At the recent Lufthansa Conference, Ed Kelly also said that sealing cargo with a tamper evident tape, such as that manufactured by CGM-AST and supplied by CGM Security Solutions, is an approved method to secure inspected cargo, and compliant with the both recommendations of the TSA and the 9/11 Act itself; so we know that tamper-evidency for cargo is mandated, and that these products provide a level of protection acceptable to TSA as compliant with the law.  Experience has shown that screening, together with security seals including Topp Clips® and tapes, is inherently beneficial to all members of the supply chain, and the recipient most of all, through theft reduction and ensuring a secure chain of custody for unattended and nondescript cargo.

The collateral functionality of CGM’s security products provides users with both enhanced security and direct cost savings.  Because this base security platform provides intrinsic benefits to everyone, all shippers should employ secure packaging techniques; and since air carriers and their customers must comply with the imperatives of the 9/11 Act, what better way to do so than with components endorsed by the TSA?

The recommended process uses CGM-AST’s Secure TRAC self wound, tamper evident tape as the primary means of closing boxes. With the following features, Secure TRAC tape is the ideal solution for packaging tamper-evidency and reliability for security throughout the logistical cycle:

• As a primary closure, the tape securely seals any corrugated box.
• The tape is sequentially numbered and made indigenous to the shipper, thereby further insuring its security and propriety, no matter who handles the cargo.  
• The tape shows the word “opened”, in any language, if peeled and cannot be resealed in cut.
• The tape is made of silicone and cannot be resealed with conventional clear carton sealing tape.
• It can be custom printed to define the user, the gateway, the client or the product in any way the shipper deems appropriate or effective.
• The tape is machine dispensable and far stronger that conventional clear or colored carton sealing tape.  
• The sequential numbers allow for specific track and trace of individual boxes and provides a clear evidence of attempted penetration even if you have no idea what the number of the tape should be.  
• This product is an approved and compliant tamper evident system that is seamless to use and facilitates expediting your cargo through your supply chain regardless if it goes by air, land, rail or sea.

Certified Inspection Facilities can employ security tape on individual packages, but larger freight volumes will require the bundled, Cargo Brick approach.  For those applications, and for shippers with larger bulk volume consignees, (such as pharmaceuticals, automotive, clothing and cigarettes) the pallet bag and Topp Clip® can be used to bulk out such cargo.

In summary, post-inspection integrity can only be achieved and maintained through the use of a robust, seamless containment system such as the Cargo Brick and/or self-voiding security tape.  The use of proven, tamper-evident security products such as these establishes a clear and visually verifiable chain of custody making the shipper and his carrier compliant, and inherently safer, against many threats than they will be without them.  Visibility, consistency, and verifiability throughout the chain of custody are prerequisites for effective security; these products, properly applied, create that condition.

Collaterally, any means by which a shipper uses to secure his cargo from the introduction of contraband is also effective against the removal of goods in the form of cargo theft.  Cargo theft in the air industry is rampant, and has no defined remedy.  Due to the speed with which air cargo travels, combined with the anonymity of the cargo and difficulty of the inspection task, most air cargo theft goes undetected until it reaches its destination at which time the theft is usually written off as a “mysterious disappearance”.  These incidents are rarely covered by insurance.  Hence, reduced exposure to theft is another, and potentially substantial, benefit of this approach.

Summary and Recommendations

It is unlikely that the 9/11 Act, which demands 100% screening of cargo carried on passenger aircraft by 2010, will be successfully, and effectively, implemented within this timeframe due to a lack of definition and direction in the legislation.  More importantly, the singular, mandated approach – screening air cargo in the same manner as passenger baggage – will not provide the presupposed level of security.  In any case, it is apparent that the burden of implementing a system to enable compliance and to achieve the broader goal of securing cargo, aircraft and passengers from terrorist acts falls, by default, squarely on private industry.  The sooner a viable solution is found, the better for all concerned.

We therefore urge government and industry and leaders, including the TSA, shippers, logistics services providers and air carriers, to endorse, and immediately commence usage of, the Cargo Brick concept and tamper-evident products described above, as appropriate, to secure cargo carried on passenger - and freighter – aircraft within the U.S. and overseas.  CGM Security Solutions will work with these leaders to develop and implement the protocols and support mechanisms required for rapid, effective deployment.  The goal of this initiative is the adoption of these solutions, in concert with prescribed screening techniques, as standard operating procedures in the U.S. and, by extension, around the world.

Failing in this, it is hoped that the proposed solutions will be embraced as de facto industry standards, with the concomitant benefits of increased security from terrorist acts, prevention of theft, lower costs of compliance and expedited supply chain flow.  Through a focused, collaborative approach to supply chain security we can quickly develop, manufacture and deploy the packaging solutions and processes needed to meet the requirements of the 9/11 Act and to better secure our world.

Notes

1.  P.L. 110-53, “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”; http://www.ise.gov/docs/nsis/Implementing911_Act.pdf

2.  Statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, February 13, 2008; www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_RLS_021308.pdf

3.  CRS Report for Congress: Air Cargo Security July 30, 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32022.pdf

4.  “TSA Ripped at Security Conference”, Air Cargo News, Volume 7, No. 110, October 6, 2008. http://www.aircargonews.com/081006/FT081006.html

5.  “Security's Tools of the Trade”, Mike Seemuth, Air Cargo World Online,  http://www.aircargoworld.com/features/0908_3.htm

6.  “Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan”, Customs and Border Protection, Washington DC, November 2004 http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_strategicplan.pdf

7. James T. Reason, Human Error, Cambridge University Press, 1990. also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Cheese_model  

8.  “Swiss Cheese Model for Cargo Screening? MIT Adds Voice to Security Debate”, Jessica Binns, Air Cargo World Online, http://www.aircargoworld.com/features/1108_3.htm

9.  CGM Security Solutions Inc., www.secureaircargo.com